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Abstract This paper extends MURPHY's (1991) analysis of alternative
lending arrangements. We incorporate the capital accumulation into the two
sector model and departure from traditional model of this kind by making
two assumptions. One of them is to postulate rigid wage and unemployment,
and the another is to assume sector-speciﬁc capital goods. We analyze then
the long-run behavior and the short-run adjustment path for macroeconomic
variables such as stock of external debt, real exchange rate, capital stocks,
investment and private consumption of a small developing country in re-
sponse to diﬀerent budgetary policy changes under three alternative lending
arrangements. The results suggest that, ﬁrst, the behavior of the economic
system under total debt and debt-ratio arrangements are the same in the
long-run and not very diﬀerent in the short- and intermediate-run; secondly,
the budgetary policies can have an inﬂuence over the external debt in the
short- and intermediate-run under the total debt ratio arrangement.
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1 Introduction
The small open developing countries often require external capital. Typically, in a
favorable environment, they need more resources than they can generate themselves
to realize their anticipated potential of growth. Over-borrowing, resulting from in-
adequate perception of domestic growth potential, has occurred occasionally. In
the 1980's, we have observed serious external debt problem in many developing
countries. Most discussions concerning the international debt problem in these
countries have focused on how to restructure lending to developing countries in
the future. It has been suggested that there should be an explicit link established
between a limited set of quantiﬁable economic criteria and the terms on which a
country can borrow from abroad. This view emphasizes the creditworthiness of
the borrowing country and focuses on the loan arrangement as a mechanism for
imposing discipline on the borrower's actions. MURPHY (1991) has given a for-
mal analysis of proposals for tying the terms of loan arrangement to measures of
creditworthiness. Three possible lending arrangements are considered: linking the
interest rate on borrowing to the country's total external debt, to its trade-balance
deﬁcit and to the ratio of its debt to traded-output.
In a setting of two-sector small open economy, MURPHY has demonstrated
that the arrangement linking interest rates on lending to the outstanding stock
of external debt is characterized by a stable macroeconomic adjustment process,
whereas arrangement that ties the interest rate to performance on the trade ac-
count is likely to be unstable. For certain types of lending arrangements, a policy
of reducing government spending to lower the budget deﬁcit can have very diﬀerent
eﬀects on the long-run level of debt, depending on the manner in which spending
is reduced. In particular, a reduction in government spending on non-traded goods
may lead to a long-run increase in the stock of debt. This is the case when the
interest rate is tied to the debt and tradable output ratio.
In a context of growth, BHANDARI, HAQUE and TURNOVSKY (1990) have
studied the case where the developing economy faces an upward-sloping supply
schedule for debt, which embodies the risk premium associated with lending to a
sovereign borrower. That corresponds to the ﬁrst case of MURPHY, where the in-
terest rate on the economy's borrowing is related to its total net external debt. In
extending the basic neoclassical growth model to an open economy context, OTANI
and VILLANUEVA (1989) study the growth of a debtor developing country facing
an interest rate related to its debt-export ratio. But their emphasis is on the role
of the government in promoting the technical progress and the formation of human
capital.
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External debt constraints can take another form. That is, the lenders, in some
cases, impose credit ceilings on borrowers, as assumed by BORENSZTEIN and
GHOSH (1989) in an intertemporal optimizing two-sector model. There, the debtor
country can choose to repudiate the debt but has to be subjected to some sanctions,
such as a permanent exclusion from foreign borrowing, and some trade-related mea-
sures that reduce the advantages of international trade for the debtor country. 2
The external constraints are imposed in the models of MURPHY (1991) and
BHANDARI, HAQUE and TURNOVSKY (1990), because the representative con-
sumer with constant time preference rate is adopted to represent all the consumers
of the small country. In contrast, the BLANCHARD's (1985) small open economy
model with overlapping perpetual youth generations does not need these externally
imposing constraints for the small economy to choose a stable level of external debt,
although the ﬁxed time preference rate and the exogenous interest rate are adopted.
BORENSZTEIN (1989) builds a model in which two period life overlapping gener-
ations framework is adopted for the consumption side, the external debt position
can then be determined as in BLANCHARD (1985). Staying in the inﬁnite hori-
zon intertemporal optimizing model, ENGEL and KLETZER (1989) study a two
sector small economy with representative consumer doted of an endogenous rate
of time preference, which is parameterized as did UZAWA (1968). In this model,
they show that the stages in the balance of payments, and hence the stages of the
external debt position, can be traced out in an optimizing framework. This kind of
stages of debt can not, of course, be generated in MURPHY (1991), BHANDARI,
HAQUE and TURNOVSKY (1990) and others, due to their adoption of inﬁnite
lifetimes and constant rate of time preference.
If the assumption that the aggregate behavior of all the consumers of the small
economy are well represented by that of a typical constant time preference rate
consumer, then the approach of BHANDARI, HAQUE and TURNOVSKY (1990)
and MURPHY (1991) is relevant. This is the beginning point of our work.
The model of BHANDARI, HAQUE and TURNOVSKY has a too simple struc-
2In all these models cited above, a developing country is often taken as a debtor
country. But the reality is more complicated. For the latin american countries:
at one hand, the government is seriously indebted, at the other hand there is
much ﬂighted capital of private sectors. If we add the government foreign debt
and the private external credit position, these latin american countries will be net
creditors. This phenomena is studied by GERTLER and ROGOFF (1990) in a
model of asymmetric information.
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ture. In contrast, the two-sector model of MURPHY does not incorporate the cap-
ital accumulation. The simple structure is responsible for their clear-cut results,
of which one is that when the interest rate prime is tied to total debt, budgetary
policy not only has no eﬀects on the external position in the long run, but also in
the short- and intermediate- run.
Two usual assumptions in a neoclassical two sector model with capital accu-
mulation, i.e. the ﬂexible wage and full employment assumption and the short-run
perfect mobility of labor and capital across sectors, appear quite unsatisfactory to
me. As to the ﬂexible wage and full employment assumption, we know that one
important problem in a under-developed country is that there exists a permanent
unemployment which cannot even be eliminated in a century, not to say that it can
disappear in a overnight time. The wage rate in these countries are generally pushed
to increase, at least not to decrease automatically, due to the exposed sector which
interacts with developed world market. This permanent upward pressure on wage
can then induce the country into a permanent unemployment or under-employment
situation, a situation which resembles to that of involuntary unemployment in the
sense of Keynes. Finally, it is not strange that there is often unemployment in a
developing country because the industrialization process is simply unachieved. If
unemployment is general and important, then the labor supply is not a constraint
for the expansion of the economy. The assumption that there is perfect mobility of
capital between sectors is quite counter-factual, especially in a developing country.
The tradable and non-tradable sector can be very diﬀerent in a developing country
due to the fact that the tradable sector is aspired by the modern industrial capital-
ism, or that the traditional sector has inherited from the country's tradition and
cannot absorb quickly the new technology of modern production.
Our analysis of budgetary policy in a indebted developing country is based on
these observations. It will be interesting to integrate these two approaches in in-
troducing capital accumulation into a two sector model. That is what we try to
do here. We choose to introduce capital accumulation process into the two-sector
model of MURPHY as do BHANDARI, HAQUE and TURNOVSKY in their one-
sector model.
The usual assumption concerning a small open economy can be stated clearly
as follows. The small debtor developing country produces and consumes traded
and non-traded goods. The price of traded goods is determined in world market
and is taken as given by the home country. We assume that the country's traded
goods sector faces perfectly elastic world demand and supply. The price of non
traded-goods is determined in the home country by the market clearing condition.
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Domestic residents and government can borrow and lend to at world ﬁnancial mar-
kets at the variable interest rate determined by the lending arrangements. For
domestic residents, this interest rate is taken as given, because each of them has a
relative small market power in relation to the national and world ﬁnancial markets
and thus has negligible inﬂuence on ﬁnancial market conditions. 3 To install the
new equipments, the country has to engage some resources to adjust the existent
stock of capital. This is modeled in using the idea of adjustment cost function.
Our principal interest is to examine the inﬂuence of capital accumulation over the
interaction between the debt and the real exchange rate and private consumption
dynamics.
Some assumptions speciﬁc to our model permit us to obtain a number of in-
teresting results diﬀerent from the Murphy's ones and from these of BHANDARI,
HAQUE and TURNOVSKY. First, we give up the ﬂexibility of real wage and full
employment assumption. An exogenous given wage rate, in terms of traded goods,
is introduced. 4 We assume, for simplicity, they are the same for the two sectors.
This exogenously given wage is too high to ensure the full employment of total
labor oﬀer. As we noted before, in fact, the indebted developing countries are of-
ten characterized by a high unemployment rate. Secondly, it is assumed that the
tradable goods are used as investment and installation goods in the tradable sector
of economy and the non-tradable goods plays the same kind of role in the non-
tradable sector. It is not diﬃcult to ﬁnd out in a developing country an abrupt
separation between traditional and modern industrial sector. There exists little
inter-sector exchange. Although this is the case, the capital can be reallocated in
the intermediate- and long-run.
The results suggest that the three alternative lending arrangements considered
in MURPHY degenerate into two; that is, the one where the interest rate related
to total net external debt and the one where the interest rate is linked to trade-
balance deﬁcit. The arrangement which links the interest to the ratio of debt to
traded output coincides now with the total net external debt arrangement, as they
present no diﬀerence in the long-run behavior and no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the
short- and intermediate-run dynamics. As remarked by MURPHY, the stability
properties of the remaining two dynamic systems corresponding to two very dif-
3BHANDARI, HAQUE and TURNOVSKY (1990, p. 393) note that an individ-
ual agent can take account of the inﬂuence of his decision on the aggregate debt
of the economy and therefore on the prevailing domestic interest rate even if the
number of such agents is large.
4In VAROUDAKIS (1990b), this rigid wage rate is justiﬁed as eﬃcient wage in
a cadre of an intertemporally optimizing ﬁrm.
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ferent lending arrangements (i.e. total debt and trade-balance deﬁcit as proxies
for creditworthiness) are also changed and become more complicated as the conse-
quences of incorporation of capital accumulation. It is in this dynamic setting we
proceed to study some debt-reduction budgetary policy propositions.
In section 2, we construct the model with capital accumulation and unemploy-
ment, and we study the short-run equilibrium; in section 3, we study the stability
of the dynamic systems under the diﬀerent external debt constraints, in section
4, we lay out long-run eﬀects of spending reduction budgetary policies, in section
5, the macroeconomic dynamic adjustment proﬁle of diﬀerent variables to non-
anticipated permanent budgetary policies will be analyzed in doing a simulation
exercise ; we conclude ﬁnally in section 6.
2 The model
2.1 The ﬁrms
The domestic ﬁrms produce traded and non-traded goods using capital and labor
as inputs through a production function
Y = F (L,K), (1)
which is assumed to possess standard neoclassical properties
FL, FK > 0, FLL, FKK < 0, FLLFKK − FKLK > 0;
we assume also that this production function satisﬁes a normality condition which
takes the following form: 5
F TLLF
T
K − F TL F TLK < 0.
Net proﬁt of the representative ﬁrm of the non-traded sector at each point of
time is therefore given by
piN = FN (LN ,KN )− w
p
LN −ΨN (IN ), (2)
where the superscript N  indicates that all these variables concern the non-traded
sector. KN , LN and w/p are respectively the existent stock of capital , the level
5The normality condition of a production function implies that when the total
cost increases, the demand of every production input augments. This concept is
derived by analogy to the normality of consumption goods in utility.
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of employment and the real wage rate in the non-traded sector. The function Ψ(.)
represents the total investment and installation costs associated with the purchase
and installation of IN units of new capital goods. It is assumed to be a convex
function of IN , that is, ΨNI > 0 and Ψ
N
II > 0. This formulation follows the orig-
inal speciﬁcation of installation costs introduced by LUCAS (1967) and GOULD
(1968). ABEL(1979) and HAYASHI(1982) postulate explicitly an installation cost
function that depends upon the existent stock of capital and the new investment.
This alternative formulation is also adopted by SEN and TURNOVSKY(1989),
and BORENSTZEIN(1989).
Assuming perfect competition on the non-traded goods market, the represen-
tative ﬁrm maximizes the present value of its proﬁts (cash-ﬂows). We also assume
that the ﬁrm ﬁnances its investments purely by retained earnings and therefore
does not need to borrow. The same assumption is maintained when study the
traded sector representative ﬁrm.
The non-tradable sector representative ﬁrm's problem can be written as follow-
ing:
max
∫ ∞
0
[FN (KN , LN )− w
p
LN −ΨN (IN )]e−rtdt, (3)
under the dynamic capital stock constraint:
K˙N = IN − δKN . (4)
The hamiltonian of this problem is
H = [FN (KN , LN )− w
p
LN −ΨN (IN )] + qN (IN − δKN ), (5)
where qN is the multiplier associated to the constraint (4).
The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
FNL =
w
p
, (6)
qN = ΨNI , (7)
q˙N = (r + δ)qN − FNK , (8)
K˙N = IN − δKN , (9)
lim
s→∞ I
Ne−rs = 0. (10)
The variable qN is the non-tradable sector capital stock's ratio of evaluation, it is
measured in terms of non-tradable.
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The tradable sector representative ﬁrm's problem can be written as following:
max
∫ ∞
0
[F T (KT , LT )− wLT −ΨT (IT )]e−rtdt, (11)
under the dynamic capital stock constraint:
K˙T = IT − δKT . (12)
The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
F TL = w, (13)
qT = ΨTI , (14)
q˙T = (r + δ)qT − F TK , (15)
K˙T = IT − δKT , (16)
lim
s→∞ I
T e−rs = 0. (17)
where qT is the multiplier associated to the constraint (12) and the capital stock,
KT , is mesured in terms of tradable.
The labor market is generally characterized by a non-binding constraint, that is
LN +LT < L¯, the total employment in the two sector is inferior to the level of full
employment, L¯. At one hand, the ﬁrst-order conditions give out dynamic eﬃcient
evolution of capital stocks and its marginal values in the short- and intermediate-
run. At other hand, giving the sector speciﬁc capital stocks 6 and non-binding
labor market constraint 7, we can derive, from the ﬁrst-order conditions of the
ﬁrms problem, an instantaneous oﬀer function for every sector. From the equation
(6), we can derive
∂LN
∂p
= − F
N2
L
pFNLL
,
∂LN
∂KN
= −F
N
LK
FNLL
.
Then in using these partial derivatives and normality condition of production fac-
tors in the non-tradable sector, we can ﬁnd out that:
yN (KN , p), yNK > 0, y
N
p > 0.
6Which implies that the capital is not reallocated across the sector in the short-
run, but through the new investment according to the long-run equalizing return
rule.
7This means that increasing employment in one sector does not induce a cor-
responding reduction in the employment in the other sector as in the standard
ﬂexible wage and full employment models. This excludes out the possible move-
ment of tradable production due to reallocation of labor between sectors.
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The real rate of return of the capital in the non-tradable sector RN = FNK can be
shown to have the following implicit form:
RN (KN , p), RNK > 0, R
N
p >,< 0, ifF
N
KL >,< 0.
In using (13), and the input normality condition, we can obtain that the pro-
duction function yT has a derivative relative to capital stock as
yTK = F
T
K + F
T
L
dLT
dKT
= F TK − F TL
F TLK
F TLL
> 0.
The oﬀer function of traded goods can be written then as
yT (KT ), yTK > 0.
The real return of the tradable sector capital stock RT = F TKL is a decreasing
function of KT only:
RT (KT ), RTK < 0.
2.2 The consumer
The inﬁnitely-lived representative consumer maximizes the discounted sum of in-
stantaneous utility:
max
∫ ∞
0
u(cT , cN )e−ρtdt, (18)
under the intertemporal budgetary constraint
a˙ = ra+ cT + pcN +ΨT (IT ) + pΨN (IN ) + τ − yT − pyN . (19)
Here, instantaneous utility is a function of consumption of non-traded goods CN
and traded goods CT , and ρ is the constant instantaneous rate of time preference.
We assume that the instantaneous utility function is concave in its two variables
and that both consumption goods are normal. 8 The debt accumulation equation
for the representative consumer is then given as (19), which is also his intertem-
poral budget, with a as the stock of debt, measured in terms of traded goods,
held by the representative consumer; and with τ as the lump-sum tax paid to the
government.
8The normality of the goods means that in the more than two goods utility
function, we have uiiuj − uiuji. This permits us to eliminate some ambiguities in
the following discussion.
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The hamiltonian of this problem can be written as:
H = u(cT , cN )− λ(ra+ cT + pcN +ΨT (IT ) + pΨN (IN ) + τ − yT − pyN ), (20)
where λ is the multiplier associated to the constraint (19).
The ﬁrst-order conditions are
uT = λ, (21)
uN = pλ, (22)
λ˙ = (ρ− r)λ, (23)
lim
s→∞ ae
−rs = 0. (24)
These conditions are usually derived in the literature. We ignore here the
distinction between capitalists and workers, that between the employed and the
unemployed and that between those employed in diﬀerent sectors. Consumers are
assumed to own all factors of production and to receive rental payments that equal
the value of production. They are permitted to borrow and lend on the internal
and the world ﬁnancial markets at an interest rate speciﬁc to their country, subject
to an intertemporal budget constraint.
The instantaneous marginal utility of traded consumption evolves according to
(23). We note that λ can be interpreted as the marginal value of wealth in terms
of tradable goods. It is also equal, at every moment, to the instantaneous marginal
utility of traded consumption, since ∂uN/∂uT = λ; and numerical subscripts denote
the partial derivative of functions. The relation (23) means that, if the subjective
rate of discount exceeds (falls short of) the interest rate, then the consumption of
the two goods must be adjusted so as to raise (lower) the marginal utility of traded
consumption.
2.3 The government
The government is assumed to operate in accordance with its budget constraint:
b˙ = rb+ pgN + gT − τ, (25)
where b is the stock of government debt, gN and gT are respectively government
spending on non-traded goods and traded goods. These spendings are assumed to
have no direct eﬀect on consumer's utility and productive technology. A deﬁcit is
produced if the government spendings plus the interest obligations on outstanding
debt is more important than its current revenues. It must be ﬁnanced either by
imposing additional lump-sum taxes or by issuing additional debt, this has no
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importance since there is a inﬁnitely-lived representative agent. The government's
intertemporal budget constraint requires that the present value of the stream of
future surplus exactly oﬀsets the value of its current debt.
2.4 The short-run equilibrium
2.4.1 The short-run macroeconomic relations
The short-run macroeconomic relationships can be represented as follows:
y(KN , p) = cN +ΨN (IN ) + gN , (26)
uT = λ, (27)
uN = pλ, (28)
qN = ΨNI , (29)
qT = ΨTI , (30)
q˙N = (r + δ)qN −RN (KN , p) (31)
K˙N = IN − δKN , (32)
q˙T = (r + δ)qT −RT (KT ), (33)
K˙T = IT − δKT , (34)
λ˙ = (ρ− r)λ, (35)
B˙ = rB + cT + pcN +ΨT (IT ) + pΨN (IN ) + gT + pgN − yT − pyN . (36)
The equations (26), (27), (28) can be used to determine cT , cN and p in terms of
λ, qN , KN and gN . The equations (29), (30) can be used to determine IN and IT
respectively in terms of qN and qT . The equation of external debt, (36), is a simple
summation of the private and governmental intertemporal budget constraints ((19)
and (25), with B = a+ b and B˙ = a˙+ b˙.
By assumption, the non-traded goods markets clear at each instant of time.
This condition (equation (26) determines the equilibrium path of the relative price
of non-traded goods. This relation can also be used to derive a dynamic relation of
real exchange rate, p in terms of other dynamic variables. But then, we have ﬁrst
to determine cN in terms of λ and p, to derive ﬁnally a dynamic equation of p as
in Murphy (1991, equation (2.11)), but the resulting dynamic relation will include
also qN and KN as determinants. This approach is simply abandoned here due to
its induced complication.
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2.5 The short-run dynamic equilibrium analysis
It is necessary, before doing the stability analysis of the system under alternative
lending arrangements, to study the the short-run reaction function of cN , cT , p,
IN , IT in terms of the dynamic variables. It is easy to see that:
IN = IN (qN ), INq > 0;
IT = IT (qT ), ITq > 0;
For the relationship between cT , cN , p and the dynamic variables λ, qN , KN and
political variable gN , we have to proceed to a total diﬀerentiation of the three
equations (26), (27), (28). 9 The variation of qN , kN and gN have some diﬀerent
eﬀects over cT according to the fact that the two goods are complementary or
substitutable in the utility function in the sense of Edgeworth. In the case of
Edgeworth complementarity, we have:
cT = cT (λ, qN ,KN , gN );
− − + −
in the case of Edgeworth substitutability, we will have:
cT = cT (λ, qN ,KN , gN )
− + − +
The short-run reaction functions cN and p do not depend on the relationship be-
tween the two goods in the instantaneous utility function. They can be expressed
as:
cN = cN (λ, qN ,KN , gN )
− − + −
p = p(λ, qN ,KN , gN )
− + − +
3 Stability analysis under alternative lending arrangements
3.1 Stability analysis under total debt arrangement
The scheme of lending arrangement using total debt as a proxy for creditworthiness
is to link the interest rate paid on debt to the total outstanding debt held both by
9See Appendix 7 for formal derivation.
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the private sector and the government. Under this arrangement, the interest rate
is positively related to total net debt, which we view as a proxy for the level of
creditworthiness:
r = r∗ + v(B) = r(B), v′ > 0, r′ > 0; (37)
where r∗ is the interest rate prevailing internationally and v(B) the country-speciﬁc
risk premium.
With this deﬁnition of external borrowing constraint, we can proceed now to the
stability analysis of the dynamic system which describes the small country. The
diﬀerentiation of the dynamic system of equations (31)(36) around the steady-
state equilibrium gives:
q˙N
K˙N
q˙T
K˙T
λ˙
B˙

=

ϕ1 ϕ2 0 0 −RNp pλ r′qN
INq −δ 0 0 0 0
0 0 r + δ −RTK 0 r′qT
0 0 ITq −δ 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −r′λ
cTq c
T
K Ψ
T
I I
T
q y
T
K c
T
λ r
′B + r


qN − q¯N
KN − K¯N
qT − q¯T
KT − K¯T
λ− λ¯
B − B¯

(38)
with ϕ1 = r+ δ−RNp pq, ϕ2 = −RNK −RNp pK . The determinant of stability matrix
of system (38) can be written in the following form:
|J | = r′λ
{
cTλ
[
ϕ1 ϕ2
INq −δ
] [
r + δ −RTK
ITq −δ
]
−RNp pλ
[
INq −δ
cTq c
T
K
] [
r + δ −RTK
ITq −δ
]}
since we know that r′ > 0, cTλ < 0, pq > 0, R
N
K < 0, pK < 0, I
N
q > 0, R
T
K < 0,
ITq > 0, Ψ
T
I > 0, y
T
K > 0, c
T
λ < 0, B > 0, then a suﬃcient condition for |J | to
be negative is that the two goods are substitutable in the utility function and the
capital and labor are substitutable in the non-tradable sector. If this is the case,
we have RNp = −F
N
L F
N
KL
pFNLL
< 0, and cTq > 0, c
T
k < 0, we can demonstrate, using the
solution of short-run, that: 10
INq c
T
K + c
T
q δ = I
N
q
λuTNy
N
K
∆
− δλuTNΨ
N
I I
N
q
∆
=
λINq uTN
∆
(yNK − δΨNI ).
uNT < 0 by assumption, and yNK − δΨNI = cNK > 0 by the non-tradable goods
market equilibrium condition, then the last expression is negative. We can also
10For the expression of partial derivations of reaction function, see 7.
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demonstrate 11 that −RNK − RNp pK > −FNKK + FNKLF
N
K
FNL
> 0 under the input nor-
mality condition, FNL F
N
KK + F
N
K F
N
KL < 0.
From there, we deduce that the determinant |J | is negative. It is possible when
there is some reasonable complementarity between the two goods in the utility
function and between the capital and labor in the non-tradable sector. We can
also have |J | < 0. This signiﬁes that the system can have one, three or ﬁve stable
engenvalues which have a negative real part.
While one cannot rule out a priori the possibility of a completely unstable
system with more than three unstable engenvalues, it is easy to show, in following
BUITER (1989), that there exist parameter values for which there are three un-
stable roots (corresponding to the non-predetermined state variables qN , qT and
the costate variable λ) and three stable roots (corresponding to the predetermined
state variables KN , KT and B). If, e.g. r′ = 0, the six characteristic roots are:
λ1 = 0, λ2 = r,
λ3,4 =
1
2
{r −RNKpq ±
√
(r −RNKpq)2 − 4[INq (RNK +RNp pK)− δ(r + δ −RNKpq)]},
λ5,6 =
1
2
{r ±
√
r2 − 4[ITq RTK − δ(r + δ)]};
where, given INq , I
T
q , pq > 0, R
N
K +R
N
p pK , R
N
K , R
T
K < 0, λ4 et λ6 sont négatives.
Engenvalues 12 are continuous functions of values of the coeﬃcients of matrix.
A small increase of r′ from zero will make the determinant of the state matrix
in (38) negative, since λ2, λ3, λ4, λ5, λ6 are far from zero, these characteristic roots
won't change sign. The zero root will become negative.
With three positive and three negative roots (all assumed to be real) the unique
continuously convergent path to the new equilibrium after, say, a reduction in
public spending, will be non-oscillatory.
11See Appendix 8 for formal derivation.
12They have to be understood as complex numbers.
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3.2 Stability analysis under total debt per tradable output ratio ar-
rangement
For the scheme linking the interest rate on international debt to the ratio of debt
to traded output, we have:
r = r∗ + z[
B
yT (KT )
], z′ > 0, (39)
= r[
B
yT (KT )
], r′ > 0; (40)
because of the unemployment and the sector speciﬁc capital assumptions, the pro-
duction of traded goods does not depend on the real exchange rate p. This is not
the case in MURPHY, where the production of tradable is assumed to depend
negatively on the real exchange rate.
Using the deﬁnition (40), the total diﬀerentiation of the dynamic system of
equations (31)  (36) around the steady-state equilibrium gives:
q˙N
K˙N
q˙T
K˙T
λ˙
B˙

=

ϕ1 ϕ2 0 φqN −RNp pλ r′qN/yT
INq −δ 0 0 0 0
0 0 r + δ −RTK + φqT 0 r′qT /yT
0 0 ITq −δ 0 0
0 0 0 φλ 0 −r′λ/yT
cTq c
T
K Ψ
T
I I
T
q y
T
K + φB c
T
λ r
′B/yT + r


qN − q¯N
KN − K¯N
qT − q¯T
KT − K¯T
λ− λ¯
B − B¯

(41)
where φ = −r′ayTK/(yT )2 < 0, ϕ1 = r + δ −RNp pq, ϕ2 = −RNK −RNp pK .
The determinant of stability matrix of system (41) can be written in the fol-
lowing form:
|J | = r
′λ
yT
{
cTλ
[
ϕ1 ϕ2
INq −δ
] [
r + δ −RTK
ITq −δ
]
−RNp pλ
[
INq −δ
cTq c
T
K
] [
r + δ −RTK
ITq −δ
]}
.
We ﬁnd that the dynamic stability properties of the system (41) is not much diﬀer-
ent from the system (38). For r′ reasonably small, we can aﬃrm that the system
has three stable characteristic roots under the substitutability assumption adopted
before.
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3.3 Trade balance arrangement
This scheme of lending arrangement is the one in which the interest rate on inter-
national lending is positively related to the trade deﬁcit. In other words, it links
debt payments to creditworthiness measured by the non-interest component of the
current account. We have then:
r = r∗ + u(M), u′ > 0, (42)
= r(M), r′ > 0; (43)
where the trade balance deﬁcit,M , is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the domestic
total absorption and production of tradable, which can be represented as:
M = cT +ΨT (IT ) + gT − yT (KT ) = M(λ, qN ,KN , gN ,KT , gT ),
if the creditworthiness of the small economy is a function of the trade balance, it
is not very diﬃcult to ﬁnd that this system is not stable.
A ﬁrst intuition can be gained in studying the dynamic equation of the costate
variable λ. The equation (35) means, if r = r(M), the external debt B can not be
determined. The remaining question is then, can the capital accumulation help to
the determination of a stable level B? To have more justiﬁcation of this intuition,
we can produce the total diﬀerentiation of the dynamic system under the trade
balance deﬁcit arrangement as follows:
y˙ = Ay (44)
with y˙ = (q˙N , K˙N , q˙T , K˙T , λ˙, B˙)′, y = (qN − q¯N ,KN − K¯N , qT − q¯T ,KT − K¯T , λ−
λ¯, B − B¯)′, and
A =

ϕ1 + κ1qN ϕ2 + κ2qN κ3qN κ4qN −RNp pλ + κ5qN 0
INq −δ 0 0 0 0
κ1q
T κ2q
T r + δ + κ3qT −RTK + κ4qT κ5qT 0
0 0 ITq −δ 0 0
−κ1λ −κ2λ −κ3λ −κ4λ −κ5λ 0
cTq + κ1B c
T
K + κ2B Ψ
T
I I
T
q + κ3B y
T
K + κ4B c
T
λ + κ5B r

where ϕ1 = r + δ − RNp pq, ϕ2 = −RNK − RNp pK , κ1 = r′MqN , κ2 = r′MKN ,
κ3 = r′MqT , κ4 = r′MKT , κ5 = r′Mλ.
The state determinant can be simpliﬁed to:
|J | = −rr′M ′λλ
[
ϕ1 ϕ− 2
INq −δ
] [
r + δ −RTK
ITq −δ
]
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−rRNp pλ
[
INq −δ
−r′M ′
qN
λ −r′M ′
KN
λ
] [
r + δ −RTK
ITq −δ
]
> 0.
The positive determinant of the state matrix signiﬁes that there are zero, two, four
or six stable characteristic roots. It is easy to ﬁnd that in a reasonable range value
of r′(> 0), the system has two stable and four unstable engenvalues. Then the sys-
tem cannot be stable. Since the state (and costate) matrix of (44) is decomposable
into two distinct blocks, then each of them must be stable in a autonomous fashion
for the total system to be stable. Then even, in the r′ < 0 case, with three stable
roots, 13 the system can not be stable. It is crucial to ﬁnd out that the external
position dynamic does not inﬂuence the other dynamic variables. The autonomy
of this equation makes it non-convergent under whatever shock, as the expanding
external position cannot engender an interactive force (feed-back) to stabilize it.
If the instability is the general case under trade balance arrangement, then the
economy system can only be viable when there is an exogenously imposing feasible
ceiling over the external debt, with occasional reduction of debt and of payment
of interests when necessary. Its analysis, rather complicated, depends on the spec-
iﬁcation of the ceiling that the lending countries can impose. It can become an
interesting case to study, but the inconvenient is that the dynamic system is broken
down to the capital accumulation. The costate variable λ's dynamics cannot attain
a stationary state if we assume that the time preference rate is diﬀerent from the
exogenously ﬁxed interest rate. Since the lending countries ﬁx the lending ceiling,
there is no reason that they can impose a variable interest rate which is a function
of the trade balance deﬁcit. The trade balance deﬁcit must always rest the same
for the given external debt.
Without the possibility of borrowing further abroad, it is then not reasonable
to assume that the domestic ﬁnancial market adopt the same interest rate than the
one on foreign debt over other domestic ﬁnancial transaction, then it may exist a
dual ﬁnancial system: two interest rates coexist, one is imposing over the foreign
borrowing, the other is endogenously determined by the domestic ﬁnancial oﬀers
and needs. This case is then not to be analyzed here, since we are interested in the
endogenous adjustment of foreign debt position of a small country facing to some
budgetary policy shocks.
13In this case, the determinant can be negative in the counter-intuitive case, the
system has three stable roots. The fact that the interest rate must diminish when
trade balance deﬁcit increases, r′ < 0, is contrary to what is proposed, i.e. an
increasing function of trade balance deﬁcit as in Murphy (1991).
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4 The budgetary policy eﬀects at long-run equilibrium under total
debt and debt-ratio arrangements
In this section, we will study the long-run eﬀects of budgetary policies under two
stable lending arrangements out of the three proposed schemes. The budgetary
policies considered here are of permanent and non-anticipated nature. As the sys-
tem in the long-run is deterministic, the temporary policies or anticipation cannot
aﬀect the long-run equilibrium. For simplicity, only balanced budgetary policies
are considered. The saving that the government can realize from reducing the
spending on tradable and non-tradable is entirely redistributed through reduction
of per capita lump-sum tax.
4.1 The total debt arrangement
The long-run equilibrium of the small economy under the total debt arrangement
can be written in imposing the stationary condition, i.e. q˙N = K˙N = q˙T = K˙T =
λ˙ = B˙ = 0, and the external lending arrangement r = r(B):
y(KN , p) = cN +ΨN (IN ) + gN , (45)
uT = λ, (46)
uN = pλ, (47)
qN = ΨNI , (48)
qT = ΨTI , (49)
[r(B) + δ]qN −RN (KN , p) = 0, (50)
IN − δKN = 0, (51)
[r(B) + δ]qT −RT (KT ) = 0, (52)
IT − δKT = 0, (53)
[ρ− r(B)]λ = 0, (54)
r(B)B + cT +ΨT + gT − yT = 0. (55)
When the external debt position of the country is determined by equation (54),
then equations (49), (52), (53) determine the long term values qT , IT ,KT ; as we
ﬁnd out, all of them are independent of the budgetary policy (namely, spending
over tradable or non-tradable goods). Of course, this does not mean that the bud-
getary policies have no inﬂuence over these variables. The contrary is true as it will
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cT cN λ p qN KN IN qT KT IT B
gN 0 − + + − − − 0 0 0 0
gT −1 − − − + + + 0 0 0 0
Table 1: The long-run eﬀects of national budgetary policies
be demonstrated in the following section when we will eﬀectuate the transitional
dynamic analysis.
As B, IT , and KT are unchanged by the budgetary policies, then by the last
relation, (55), we ﬁnd that cT is only inﬂuenced by the public spending on tradable
goods, gT , at one-to-one basis. The spending on non-tradable goods, gN , has only
inﬂuence over cN . The importance of the late policy over the private consumption
has to be evaluated more carefully since it also change the relative price and the
marginal value of the wealth and the oﬀer conditions of the non-tradable sector.
The public spending, gT , has also an inﬂuence over cN , p, qN , IN and KN in the
long-run which must also be asserted before we pass to a dynamic analysis.
The long-run eﬀects of the budgetary policies can be represented in table 1.14
We can shortly comment the results as follows. The long-run eﬀects of reduction
of the spending on non-tradable goods does not modify the consumption of trad-
able goods, but reduces the consumption of non-tradable. If this policy reduces the
pressure on the non-tradable market, it has to be stimulated up ﬁnally by a lower
price (real exchange rate) level. From the external equilibrium condition of the
economy, a lower price of non-tradable will discourage the tradable consumption
under the substitutability assumption. For the equilibrium to be re-established,
there must be a decrease in the marginal value of wealth. The diminution of price,
inducing a higher real wage rate in the small country will incite the non-tradable
sector to employ less labor which is substitutable to the capital, then the Tobin's
q, the long-run capital stock and investment ﬂux of the non-tradable sector will
increase. Of course, in the case of complementarity between diﬀerent kinds of
goods and productive inputs, this policy's eﬀect concerning the marginal value
of wealth, λ, the Tobin's q, the optimal capital stock and investment ﬂux will
change drastically. More precisely, the signs of policy eﬀects are reversed. Then
the same policy will have positive eﬀect on λ, negative eﬀects on qN , IN and KN .
The rest of the eﬀects is the same in the substitutability and complementarity case.
14For the formal derivation, see Appendix 9
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For a permanent non-anticipated reduction in the public spending on the trad-
able goods, it is clear that this policy crowds in hundred percent the private
consumption of tradable. This will increase the marginal value of wealth, which in
turn renders the non-tradable market into excess demand by increasing the private
consumption. The excess demand can only be removed by a corresponding in-
crease of the real exchange rate, which will ﬁnally translate into negative variation
of non-tradable sector capital stock and corresponding variation of marginal value
of capital in this sector.
4.2 The long-run eﬀects of budgetary policies under the debt-ratio
arrangement
Under this arrangement, the variables as B, qT , IT and KT are determined by
equations (54), (49), (52) and (53), independently of other equations. The na-
tional budgetary policies have no inﬂuence over them in the long-run. As before,
this does not mean that these variables are also shielded from the policy changes in
the short-run. The eﬀects of budgetary policies are totally similar to those in the
case of the total debt arrangement. Since the long-run eﬀects of budgetary policies
are in the same way than those in the case of total debt arrangement, we can then
refer to table 1 for them.
5 Transitional dynamics under policy shocks: a simulation exercise
The full dynamic interaction of the system under diﬀerent lending arrangement is
too complicated to be analyzed. For having an idea of the short- and intermediate-
run movements of diﬀerent variables, we give ﬁrst a general formulation of resolu-
tion of the dynamics, then we proceed to a simulation exercise.
5.1 Total debt arrangement
With three stable roots (assumed to be real) and three predetermined variables,
the system is expected to exhibit a saddle-point equilibrium conﬁguration under
perfect foresight assumption. Then, the adjustment path can take generally the
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following form: 15
qN (t)− q¯N
KN (t)− K¯N
qT (t)− q¯T
KT (t)− K¯T
λ(t)− λ¯
B(t)− B¯

=

V11 V12 V13
V21 V22 V23
V31 V32 V33
V41 V42 V43
V51 V52 V53
V61 V62 V63

 k1e−λ1tk2e−λ2t
k3e
−λ3t
 (56)
where (V1j , ..., V6j)′, j = 1, 2, 3, are engenvectors associated to engenvalues λ1 <
λ2 < λ3 < 0. The constants ki, i = 1, 2, 3, can be obtained from the following
system  V21 V22 V23V41 V42 V43
V61 V62 V63

 k1e−λ1tk2e−λ2t
k3e
−λ3t
 =
 KN (t)− K¯NKT (t)− K¯T
B(t)− B¯
 (57)
in letting t = 0, the coeﬃcients k1, k2, k3 are calculated in using the initial condi-
tions KN (0),KT (0), B(0). Since KN (0)−K¯N 6= 0,KT (0)−K¯T = 0, B(0)−B¯ = 0,
they can be quite simpliﬁed.
A general remark that we can make about the solution in (56) is that, though
the variables as B, qT , KT do not change in the long-run facing to whatever bud-
getary policies shocks, they are not stationary in the short- and intermediate-run.
But the solution is too general to gain some intuitive comprehension of the dy-
namic adjustment proﬁle of the system under disequilibrium, since there are too
much factors which work in diﬀerent ways. A simulation exercise is proposed here.
Given r = 0.04, δ = 0.05, RNp = −0.1, RNK = −0.21, pq = 0.1, pλ =
−0.4, pK = −0.1, qN = 1.2, qT = 1.3, RTK = −0.2, INq = 2, ITq = 2.2,
cTq = 0.08, c
T
K = −0.02, ΨNI = 1.2, yNK = 0.5, cTλ = −0.6, B = 10, λ, r′ =
0.003, the characteristic roots of the state matrix of liberalized system (38) can be
shown as, λ1 = −0.6489871086, λ2 = −0.6122056431, λ3 = −0.02206804787, λ4 =
0.08009209496, λ5 = 0.7012283941, λ6 = 0.6619403129. There are three stable and
three unstable roots.
The dynamic adjustment corresponding to a reduction of public spending on
non-tradable goods (KN (0) − K¯N > 0) can be illustrated in the ﬁgure 1. It
is shown by the simulation that, although the long-run value of qT , KT , a and
IT cannot be inﬂuenced by the policy, they can be modiﬁed in the short-run by
15For a detailed characterization of the stable manifold under rational anticipa-
tion condition, see VAROUDAKIS (1990a).
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Figure 1: The short- and intermediate-run eﬀect of a permanent non-anticipated
reduction of spending on non-tradable goods.
Figure 2: The short- and intermediate-run eﬀect of a permanent non-anticipated
reduction of spending on tradable goods.
the dynamic response of the economy to this permanent shock which engenders
initially a pressure on the non-tradable market. The transmission of the eﬀects of
the shock can be easily understood in this simple model. When the shock arrives,
the depression on the non-tradable market is moved by reducing (more possibly)
the real exchange rate more then necessary compared to its long-run level. The
ambiguity persists due to the double inﬂuence of adjustment of consumption plan
of consumers and the revaluation of the market value of non-tradable sector. The
overshooting of real exchange rate cannot be established easily since there are two
factors which interact to determine its pattern of initial adjustment. The variation
of marginal value of wealth and the marginal value of non-tradable sector capital
stock can be translated into initial overshooting, retarded overshooting or other
form of adjustment of real exchange rate. In the substitutability case, the pattern
of the variation of the tradable consumption is simple, it increases sharply to be
reduced gradually later. This explain why there is an external debt (B) dynamics
in the short-run, which in turn explains the transitory movement of qT , KT and
IT .
The reaction of the economy following a permanent non-anticipated reduction
of spending on tradable goods can be illustrated in ﬁgure 2. The same kind of
remarks as that regarding the 1 can be made.
5.2 Debt ratio arrangement
Given r = 0.04, δ = 0.05, RNp = −0.1, RNK = −0.21, pq = 0.1, pλ = −0.4, pK =
−0.1, qN = 1.2, qT = 1.3, RTK = −0.2, INq = 2, ITq = 2.2, cTq = 0.08, cTK = −0.02,
ΨNI = 1.2, y
N
K = 0.5, c
T
λ = −0.6, B = 10, λ, r′ = 0.03, yT = 15, the charac-
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teristic roots of the state (and costate) matrix of liberalized system (44) can be
shown as, λ1 = −0.6469368852, λ2 = −0.6121156831, λ3 = −0.01707689893, λ4 =
0.06925727297, λ5 = 0.6619296437, λ6 = 0.6949435444. There are three stable and
three unstable roots. The short-run behavior of the system under debt ratio ar-
rangement is similar as under the total debt arrangement.
6 Conclusion
This paper has extended MURPHY's (1991) analysis of alternative lending arrange-
ments in incorporating capital accumulation process. Another departure from the
cited analysis is that we do not assume the full employment. This unemploy-
ment assumption is responsible for some results in this paper, notably the quasi-
equivalence of the total debt arrangement and debt-traded output ratio arrange-
ment. We distinguish diﬀerent kinds of policy changes according to their properties
such as spending on traded and non-traded goods. MURPHY (1991) demonstrated
that under total debt arrangement, the policy which consists to reduce spending
on traded or non-traded goods has no eﬀect on the country's net external debt po-
sition. A similar result is obtained by BHANDARI, HAQUE and TURNOVSKY
(1990) in their one sector model, the public spending has not any eﬀect neither on
capital stock nor on external debt in the short- and long-run. While under debt
ratio arrangement, MURPHY's results suggest that the reduction in spending on
tradable goods reduces the steady state level of debt. A reduction in spending on
non-traded goods will actually increase the steady-state level of debt.
The ﬁrst interesting ﬁnding in our model is that, under the lending arrangement
based on the ratio of debt to traded output as under the total debt arrangement,
the permanent reduction in spending on tradable or non-tradable will not increase
nor decrease external debt, in the long-run. The reason for this is that, under
the rigid wage and unemployment assumption and the sector-speciﬁc investment
and installation goods assumption, no reallocation of capital and labor between
the two sectors is eﬀectuated in the short-run, the instantaneous tradable oﬀer
function depends only on the existent tradable sector capital stock. In MURPHY,
the trade balance arrangement is totally unstable. In our model, the global stability
analysis suggests that, even if capital accumulation is introduced, this arrangement
cannot change original instability of the economy, as if it is the case under perfect
international ﬁnancial market condition.
country's net
The second interesting ﬁnding is that, although the long-run eﬀects of bud-
23
getary policy eﬀects are absent in regard to the external debt, the capital stock,
investment and marginal value of capital in the tradable sector, the diﬀerent spend-
ing reduction policies can generate interesting short-run dynamic eﬀect on external
debt level, since then on the trade balance and the balance of payment. These tran-
sitory dynamic movements of external debt are accompanied by those of tradable
sector capital stock, investment and marginal capital value. We remarked that,
in this interaction context with more than one predetermined variable, the initial
overshooting of real exchange rate  which is quite popular in rational anticipation
open economy models  is more diﬃcult to be re-established.
The deterministic steady state equilibrium debt level under the two stabiliz-
ing lending arrangements is quite contrasting to what can be determined in some
constant time preference inﬁnite horizon models which adopt perfect international
ﬁnancial market assumption. There, the steady state but can be inﬂuenced by the
temporary policy changes and the anticipation of policy changes. 16
The puzzling assumption that the representative consumer's subjective rate of
discount is equal to the interest rate facing the country in question is quite crucial
for ensuring steady state equilibrium in a small open developing country facing a
perfect world ﬁnancial market. It is somewhat contradictory to have a constant
subjective rate of discount which has to be equal to the world interest rate facing
the country. The diﬀerent lending arrangements are one kind of departures from
this standard troubling case, which permits us to do some interesting budgetary
policy analysis in a developing country. One can also drop this assumption by
endogenizing the rate of discount as did OBSTFELD (1981, 1990), ENGEL and
KLETZER (1989). This will permit us to explain the developing country's initial
debt and the stages of external debt position. Another possibility to drop this
assumption is to use an overlapping generation framework (BLANCHARD, 1985;
BUITER, 1988a, b).
The structure of this model has the property that the economy is either an ex-
porter when there is a trade account surplus or an importer when there is a trade
account deﬁcit. In fact, any country will export and import at the same time; the
trade deﬁcit or surplus is only a small quantity compared to total commercial ﬂux.
A more realistic model will incorporate this commercial ﬂux to avoid omitting some
important economic phenomena. The policies considered here are quite simple. It
may be interesting to consider the eﬀects of more complex types of budgetary and
ﬁscal policy mix. It may also be interesting to consider the eﬀects of some struc-
16See MATSUYAMA (1988, 1991), SEN and TURNOVSKY (1989).
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tural policies which consist to stimulate the growth in helping the development of
new production sector in the developing country.
7 The short-run reaction function of consumption and real exchange
rate
For the relationship between cT , cN , p and the dynamic variables λ, qN , KN and
political variable gN , we have to proceed to a total diﬀerentiation of the three
equations (26), (27), (28) as follows:
 uTT uTN 0uNT uNN −λ
0 −1 yNp

 dcTdcN
dp
 =
 1 0 0 0p 0 0 0
0 ΨNI I
N
q −yNK 1


dλ
dqN
dkN
dgN
 (58)
The solution of this system can be obtained in using the Cramer's rule:
 dcTdcN
dp
 = 1
∆
 yNp uNN − λ −uTNyNp −λuTN−yNp uNT uTT yNp λuTT
−uNT uTT uTTuNN − u2NT

 1 0 0 0p 0 0 0
0 ΨNI I
N
q −yNK 1


dλ
dqN
dKN
dgN

(59)
=
1
∆
 yNp (uNN − puTN )− λ −λuTNΨNI INq λuTNyNK −λuTNyNp (uTT − puNT ) λuTTΨNI INq −λuTT yNK λuTT
−uNT + puTT JΨNI INq JyNK J


dλ
dqN
dkN
dgN

where ∆ = (uTTuNN − u2TN )yNp − λuTT > 0, and J = (uTTuNN − u2TN ) > 0,
(uNN −puTN ) < 0, (uTT −puNT ) < 0,−uNT +puTT < 0, these last three relations
are veriﬁed by normality condition.
8 The sign of an expression
−RNK −RNp pK = −(FNKK + FNKL
dL
dK
)− FNKL
dL
dp
pK
= −(FNKK + FNKL
dL
dK
)− FNKL
dL
dp
−(uTTuNN − u2NT )yNK
(uTTuNN − u2NT )yNp − λuTT
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> −(FNKK + FNKL
dL
dK
)− FNKL
dL
dp
−(uTTuNN − u2NT )yNK
(uTTuNN − u2NT )yNp
since λuTT < 0,
= −(FNKK + FNKL
dL
dK
) + FNKL
dL
dp
yNK
yNp
= −(FNKK + FNKL
dL
dK
) + FNKL
dL
dp
(FNK + F
N
L
dL
dK )
FNL
dL
dp
= −(FNKK + FNKL
dL
dK
) + FNKL
FNK
FNL
+ FNKL
dL
dK
= −FNKK + FNKL
FNK
FNL
> 0 if FNL F
N
KK + F
N
K F
N
KL < 0.
9 The derivation of long-run eﬀect of budgetary policies
Using IN = KN from equation (51), we can study the long-run eﬀects of budgetary
policies in totally diﬀerentiating equations (45)  (48), (50) and (55) as follows:
0 −1 0 yNp 0 yNK − δΨNI
uTT uTN −1 0 0 0
uNT uNN −p −λ 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 −δΨNII
0 0 0 −RNp r + δ −RNK
1 0 0 0 0 0


dcT
dcN
dλ
dp
dqN
dKN

=

1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 −1

[
dgN
dgT
]
(60)
The solution of this system gives
dcT
dcN
dλ
dp
dqN
dKN

=
1
∆

A11 −A16
A21 −A26
A31 −A36
A41 −A46
A51 −A56
A61 −A66

[
dgN
dgT
]
(61)
where
∆ = [λ−(uNN−puTN )yNp ][−RNK+(r+δ)δΨNII ]−RNp (uNN−puTN )(yNK−δΨNI ) > 0,
since RNp = F
N
KL
dL
dp < 0 under the assumption that F
N
KL < 0 (substitutability
between labor and capital), we have to use an input normality condition which
presents the following form:
FNL F
N
KK − FNK FNKL < 0.
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It is then easy to demonstrate that the determinant is positive. For that it is
suﬃcient to show that
−yNp RNK +RNp yNK > 0.
In fact we have yNp = F
N
L
dL
dp , R
N
p = F
N
KL
dL
dp , y
N
K = F
N
K + F
N
L
dL
dK , R
N
K = F
N
KK +
FNKL
dL
dK , in substituting these expressions into the above inequality and in using
the input normality condition, we ﬁnd out that this inequality is veriﬁed.
The cofactors in (61) can be given as:
A11 = 0, A21 = λ[RNK − (r + δ)δΨNII ] < 0,
A31 = −uTNλ[−RNK + (r + δ)δΨNII ] > 0,
A41 = (puTN − uNN )[−RNK + (r + δ)δΨNII ] > 0,
A51 = (puTN − uNN )RNp δΨNII < 0, A61 = (puTN − uNN )RNp < 0,
A16 = [λ− (uNN − puTN )yNp ][−RNK + (r + δ)δΨNII ]−RNp (uNN − puTN )(yNK − δΨNI ) > 0,
A26 = (uNN − puTN )yNp [−RNK + (r + δ)δΨNII ]−RNp (uNN − puTN )(yNK − δΨNI ) > 0,
A36 = [−λuTT − (uNN − puTN )yNp ][−RNK + (r + δ)δΨNII ]−RNp (uNT − puTT )(yNK − δΨNI ) > 0,
A46 = (uNT − puTT )[−RNK + (r + δ)δΨNII ] > 0,
A56 = (uNN − puTN )RNp δΨNII < 0, A66 = (uNT − puTT )RNp < 0.
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